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THE PROBLEM OF SUNSETS
JILL FISCH* & STEVEN DAVIDOFF SOLOMON**

ABSTRACT
An increasing percentage of corporations are going public with dual class
stock in which the shares owned by the founders or other corporate insiders
have greater voting rights than the shares sold to public investors. Some
commentators have criticized the dual class structure as unfair to public
investors by reducing the accountability of insiders; others have defended the
value of dual class in encouraging innovation by providing founders with
insulation from market pressure that enables them to pursue their idiosyncratic
vision.
The debate over whether dual class structures increase or decrease corporate
value is, to date, unresolved. Empirical studies have failed to provide conclusive
evidence as to the effect of dual class structures, and calls for regulators or stock
exchanges to adopt prohibitions banning dual class structures outright have
been unsuccessful, although several index providers have banned dual class
stock from major indexes such as the S&P 500.
As a result, some commentators have advocated a compromise position
permitting corporations to go public with dual class structures but requiring
that they include mandatory time-based sunset provisions. The sunset provisions
would automatically convert the dual class structure to a single share structure
after the passage of a pre-determined period of time. The Council of Institutional
Investors has asked the New York Stock Exchange and Nasdaq to refuse to list
the shares of dual class firms unless they contain a time-based sunset provision
that would convert within seven years.
This Article does not take a position on whether dual class structures are
value-enhancing, but it does challenge the proposition that time-based sunsets
are an appropriate response to the debate over dual class structures and that
they should be imposed through regulation or stock exchange rules. To the
extent that dual class structures are problematic, sunsets do not solve that
problem. Moreover, time-based sunsets are an arbitrary response to the concern
that developments such as the decline in a founder’s economic interest or the
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transfer of high-vote shares to third parties may reduce the attractiveness of the
dual class structure. In addition, time-based sunsets create potential moral
hazard problems. Further, because of their problematic incentives, minority
shareholders cannot address the limitations of time-based sunsets through a
retention vote.
This Article observes that event-based sunsets, which have received less
attention, focus on the specific developments that are likely to erode the potential
value of dual class structures, and calls for market participants to explore them
further through private ordering. Nonetheless, it argues that, at the present time,
investors and policymakers lack sufficient information about either dual class
or sunsets to justify using regulation, index requirements, or stock exchange
rules to force companies into adopting sunsets. Last, it argues that, rather than
relying on compulsory sunsets to evade the difficult policy issues raised by dual
class, the debate should encompass a more thorough framing of the role and
importance of shareholder voting rights.
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INTRODUCTION
The popularity of dual class voting structures in publicly traded companies
has increased dramatically in the past few years. Dual class structures provide
that all the shares of the issuer’s stock have equal economic rights, but that the
shares owned by the founders or other corporate insiders have greater voting
rights than the shares sold to public investors. While only a handful of companies
went public with dual class structures prior to 2010, the percentage of initial
public offerings (“IPOs”) involving companies with dual class stock has
skyrocketed, increasing to 19% of IPOs in 2017.1 Currently more than 10% of
large companies in the S&P 500 index have publicly traded shares with limited
voting power.2
The rise of dual class stock has spurred controversy and debate.3 The Council
of Institutional Investors (“CII”) has broadly endorsed the principle of “one
share, one vote.”4 In response to concerns expressed by CII and a number of
institutional investors, several major index providers excluded dual class shares
from major stock indexes such as the S&P 500.5 Scholars argue that dual class
creates the opportunity for founders to enjoy private benefits and exacerbates
managerial agency costs.6 In his first speech as Securities and Exchange
Commission (“SEC”) Commissioner, Robert Jackson compared dual class
shares to “corporate royalty.”7

1

COUNCIL OF INSTITUTIONAL INV’RS, DUAL-CLASS IPO SNAPSHOT: 2017-2018 STATISTICS
(2018), https://www.cii.org/files/2018Q3%20IPO%20Stats.pdf [https://perma.cc/6XBR-ML
64] (noting that out of 124 IPOs, “23, or 19%, had dual class structures with unequal voting
rights”).
2
Madison Marriage, State Street Asks SEC to Block Non-Voting Shares, FIN. TIMES: FTFM,
June 19, 2017, at 1.
3
See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Dual Class Stock: The Shades of Sunset, CLS BLUE SKY
BLOG (Nov. 19, 2018), http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2018/11/19/dual-class-stock-theshades-of-sunset/ [https://perma.cc/DG9C-JDPF] (describing academics and practitioners as
“polarized” over appropriateness of dual class structures).
4
See Dual-Class Stock, COUNCIL OF INSTITUTIONAL INV’RS, https://www.cii.org/dualclass
_stock [https://perma.cc/XRJ4-S6R5] (last visited Apr. 10, 2019) (“CII’s policies endorse the
principle of ‘one share, one vote’: every share of a public company’s common stock should
have equal voting rights.”).
5
See, e.g., Nicole Bullock, S&P to Ban Entrants with Multiple Share Classes, FIN. TIMES,
Aug. 2, 2017, at 24 (reporting S&P Dow Jones Indices’s decision to prevent companies with
multiple share classes from joining S&P 500).
6
See, e.g., Paul A. Gompers, Joy Ishii & Andrew Metrick, Extreme Governance: An
Analysis of Dual-Class Firms in the United States, 23 REV. FIN. STUD. 1051, 1051-54 (2010)
(finding that dual class companies have higher agency costs and reduced firm value).
7
Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Address at Univ. Cal.
Berkeley Sch. of Law: Perpetual Dual-Class Stock: The Case Against Corporate Royalty
(Feb. 15, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/perpetual-dual-class-stock-case-againstcorporate-royalty [https://perma.cc/2FXJ-UU9G].
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Despite the criticisms, some commentators defend dual class stock, arguing
that it is a valuable tool that allows a founder to realize his or her idiosyncratic
vision of the company without being subject to the pressure of activists and other
investors for short term returns.8 In addition, dual class structures may increase
the willingness of founders to take their companies public, potentially mitigating
the decline in the number of public companies and leading companies that would
choose not to do so without the availability of a dual class structure to enter the
public markets.9 Limiting the voting rights of transient public investors may
enhance productivity, not just in start-ups, but in established companies too.
Indeed, outside the United States, regulators and stock exchanges are modifying
their rules to facilitate greater use of dual class voting structures.10
The debate over whether dual class structures increase or decrease corporate
value is, to date, unresolved. The empirical evidence on the effect of dual class
stock on economic value is inconclusive.11 The results of empirical analysis are
also subject to fundamental econometric limitations, including pervasive
selection effects. In the absence of definitive empirical evidence, theory and
policy have dominated the discourse, and a number of proposals to ban or

8
See, e.g., Zohar Goshen & Assaf Hamdani, Corporate Control and Idiosyncratic Vision,
125 YALE L.J. 560, 590 (2016) (arguing that dual class structures enable entrepreneurs to
pursue their idiosyncratic visions but expose minority shareholders to substantial agency
costs).
9
See Emily Stewart, SEC Chair Highlights Need for More Public Companies in First
Public Speech, THESTREET (July 13, 2017, 12:20 AM), https://www.thestreet.com/story/
14224963/1/sec-chair-highlights-need-for-more-public-companies-in-first-publicspeech.html [https://perma.cc/7FDS-H68L] (quoting SEC Chair Jay Clayton as identifying
decline in U.S.-listed public companies as “a serious issue for our markets and the country
more general[ly]”). As Professor Jack Coffee observes, “practitioners point to recent
examples of dual class IPOs, which in 2018 included Dropbox, Inc., GreenSky, Inc., Pivotal
Software, Inc., Pluralsight, Inc., and SmartSheet, Inc., to argue that these issuers would have
remained outside the public markets if they could not have used a dual class capitalization.”
Coffee, Jr., supra note 3.
10
Benjamin Robertson, Hong Kong Adds Dual-Class Shares, Paving Way for Tech Titans,
BLOOMBERG (Apr. 24, 2018, 6:27 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-0424/hong-kong-approves-dual-class-shares-paving-way-for-tech-titans (highlighting Hong
Kong’s approval of dual class shares in IPOs which amounts to “biggest change to its initial
public offering rules in two decades”); Angela Tan, SGX Enters New Era as It Starts DualClass Shares for Qualifying IPOs, BUS. TIMES (June 27, 2018, 5:50 AM),
https://www.businesstimes.com.sg/stocks/sgx-enters-new-era-as-it-starts-dual-class-sharesfor-qualifying-ipos [https://perma.cc/R7LJ-FVHG] (reporting that Singapore Exchange
approved first time companies with dual class structures to seek primary listing). We
recognize of course, that this may be a response to market pressures and the global
competition for listings. See Steven M. Davidoff, Regulating Listings in a Global Market, 86
N.C. L. REV. 89, 102-14 (2007) (outlining competition among global stock exchanges for
different listings).
11
See infra notes 59-64 and accompanying text.
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otherwise circumscribe the effects of dual class stock have emerged in the last
few years.12
The latest policy proposal—so-called “sunset provisions”—offers a
compromise position between an outright prohibition of dual class structures and
allowing issuers freely to adopt a “perpetual” dual class structure. Sunset
provisions provide that, under stipulated circumstances, an issuer’s dual class
structure automatically converts into a single class structure in which all shares
have equal voting power. The inclusion of sunset provisions in the charters of
dual class issuers has been defended as a way of balancing the protection of the
founder’s ability to innovate with the need to minimize agency costs. As CII
explains in defense of its support of sunsets: “Since 2016 CII has supported
sunset provisions if necessary to achieve alignment over a reasonable period of
time.”13 SEC Commissioner Jackson stated that, unless the higher voting rights
had a sunset provision, they were “antithetical to our values as Americans.”14 In
support of his position that dual class companies should include sunset
provisions, Commissioner Jackson reported the results of preliminary empirical
analysis showing that the valuations of dual class IPO companies with sunset
provisions diverged from and exceeded the valuations of those companies with
perpetual dual class stock, beginning two years after the IPO.15 Similarly,
Professors Lucian Bebchuk and Kobi Kastiel present empirical evidence that the
adverse effects of dual class stock increase over time and advocate sunset
provisions as a response to this problem.16
The debate over sunset provisions has focused primarily on time-based sunset
provisions that eliminate higher voting rights after a designated period of time—
commonly seven to ten years.17 Time-based sunsets are appealing, in part
because they appear to offer a solution to the empirical findings reported by

12

See, e.g., Inv’r as Owner Subcomm., Discussion Draft Re: Dual Class and Other
Entrenching Governance Structures in Public Companies, SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N,
https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/investor-advisory-committee-2012/discussion-draft-dualclass-recommendation-iac-120717.pdf [https://perma.cc/TSE4-8H9D] (last visited Apr. 10
2019) (noting “unique” risks posed by dual class structures).
13
Dual-Class Stock, supra note 4.
14
Jackson, Jr., supra note 7.
15
Id. (“Seven or more years out from their IPOs, firms with perpetual dual-class stock
trade at a significant discount to those with sunset provisions.”).
16
Lucian A. Bebchuk & Kobi Kastiel, The Untenable Case for Perpetual Dual-Class
Stock, 103 VA. L. REV. 585, 631 (2017).
17
See, e.g., Andrew William Winden, Sunrise, Sunset: An Empirical and Theoretical
Assessment of Dual-Class Stock Structures, 2018 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 852, 870 (describing
time-based sunsets as “presumably what most institutional investors and proxy advisors are
referring to when they insist that dual-class companies must adopt reasonable sunset
provisions”).
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Commissioner Jackson and Professors Bebchuk and Kastiel that the potential
advantages of a dual class structure decline over time.18
This Article questions whether the current focus on sunset provisions is
warranted. If dual class is a valuable tool for early stage corporate growth in
some companies, it is unclear how a bright-line time limit that does not reflect
company-specific needs makes sense. More generally, much of the discourse
around sunset provisions is really about dual class stock itself and whether it is
desirable. Time-based sunsets are better understood as a “split the baby”
approach19 to the controversy over whether policymakers should permit dual
class structures in public companies. We believe however that, as with many
other debates over good corporate governance, a one-size-fits-all approach is
overly simplistic. Dual class stock may be desirable for some companies but not
others, and the continued value of dual class structures is likely to depend on
company-specific factors that vary subsequent to the IPO. The debate about
sunset provisions should therefore focus on these factors.
In this light, a sunset provision can perhaps better be understood as an
insurance policy against a founder whose idiosyncratic vision turns out, in
hindsight, to be flawed. But a tool that facilitates the displacement of that
founder after seven to ten years—an eternity in the life of an innovative neweconomy company—seems an inapposite and potentially costly mechanism. As
explained here, an arbitrary time limit that is predetermined at the IPO stage is
a noisy proxy for assessing the desirability of retaining the dual class structure.
Rather, we identify several particular issuer-specific developments that
potentially erode the desirability of dual class. The most important of these
developments are substantial dilution of the founder’s stake; transfer of high
voting stock to a non-founder; and death, incapacitation, or departure of the
founder. Obviously, the passage of time increases the potential for these
developments but, as argued here, it is these developments, and not time alone,
that are critical for the continued effectiveness of dual class. To the extent sunset
provisions are warranted, they should incorporate these developments, and any
regulatory effort should be similarly focused.
This Article further challenges the claim that the potential downside of
mandatory time-based sunsets can be remedied by enabling shareholders to vote
to extend the dual class structure beyond the sunset deadline.20 Although in
18
See, e.g., Bebchuk & Kastiel, supra note 16, at 630 (“[C]ontrollers have perverse
incentives to retain dual-class structures even when those structures become substantially
inefficient.”).
19
Splitting the baby refers to the Biblical telling of the Judgement of King Solomon. 1
Kings 3:16-28.
20
See, e.g., Letter from Ash Williams, Chair, Council of Institutional Inv’rs, Ken Bertsch,
Exec. Dir., Council of Institutional Inv’rs, & Jeff Mahoney, Gen. Counsel, Council of
Institutional Inv’rs, to Elizabeth King, Chief Regulatory Officer, Intercontinental Exch. Inc.
5 (Oct. 24, 2018), https://www.cii.org/files/issues_and_advocacy/correspondence/2018/2018
1024%20NYSE%20Petition%20on%20Multiclass%20Sunsets%20FINAL.pdf [https://perm
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theory shareholders should vote to retain dual class structures in situations in
which enhanced founder control is value-enhancing, this Article questions
whether the institutional investors who would control such a voting decision
would have the appropriate incentives to vote to retain the dual class structure.
It similarly highlights the perverse incentives that a time-based sunset creates
for those who hold high vote stock.
This Article attempts to reorder the debate over dual class stock, positing that
dual class stock responds to the evolving reality of capital market structure in
the United States and the world. In certain circumstances, dual class stock may
be appropriate for certain companies, particularly at the IPO stage, but in others
it is not. As the private capital markets have expanded, new companies are no
longer compelled to seek capital from public investors. The reduced market
power of public investors requires them, in some cases, to accept a diminished
voice in exchange for a broader range of investment opportunities. Sunsets
reflect our discomfort with this shift in the balance of power, but it is unclear
that, given the current ownership structure of public companies,21 sunsets are the
right tool to address dual class concerns. Instead, we should better frame what is
at stake in the debate over voting rights.
I.
A.

BACKGROUND

Dual Class and Its Variants

Dual class stock refers to a capital structure in which shares of an issuer’s
common stock with equal economic rights differ with respect to their relative
voting power. The common stock22 in a dual class company is divided into two
or more classes, in which the shares with more voting power are typically
described as high vote stock, and the shares with less voting power are described
as low vote stock. The precise ratio of voting power varies, but it is common for
high vote shares to have ten times the voting power of low vote shares.23 Some
a.cc/5TCV-FY7M] (proposing that issuers with dual class structure be required to have a
mandatory sunset provision of seven years or less, but that issuers be permitted to allow
shareholders to vote to retain dual class structure).
21
See Jill E. Fisch, Assaf Hamdani & Steven Davidoff Solomon, Passive Investors 17
(European Corp. Governance Inst., Research Paper No. 414, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3192069 [https://perma.cc/7DAT-GCZX] (identifying
increasingly concentrated ownership of public companies by passive investors and potential
consequences of this concentration).
22
Dual class common stock is a different capital structure than having both preferred and
common stock. Common stock has different economic rights from preferred stock, as well as
different voting rights. Preferred stockholders typically have reduced or nonexistent voting
rights and instead have greater rights with respect to dividend payments or liquidation
preferences.
23
Dual-Class Stock, supra at note 4 (“The ratio most frequently employed is 10 votes per
superior share to one vote per inferior share.”).
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issuers may have a third class of stock with no voting rights at all.24 Due to stock
exchange restrictions, dual class structures must be implemented at the IPO stage
and midstream adoptions are prohibited.25
Founders or other early stage investors use dual class stock to retain control
of the firm. At the time of the IPO, the founders or other early stage investors
retain high vote shares, and the low vote shares are issued to public investors.26
The key advantage offered by the dual class structure is that it enables those who
own the high vote shares to divest a substantial portion of their economic stake
without losing voting control. Dual class stock thus cements control of the firm
with a core group of investors for an extended, and historically an indeterminate
period of time.
B.

The Rise of Dual Class

The modern use of dual class stock dates back to 1976. In that year, Wang
Laboratories listed using dual class on the American Stock Exchange
(“AMEX”).27 The listing was controversial, and at the time barred by the New
York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”).28 AMEX allowed the listing, but only under

24
See Ken Bertsch, Council of Institutional Inv’rs, Snap and the Rise of No-Vote Common
Shares, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (May 26, 2017), https://corpgov
.law.harvard.edu/2017/05/26/snap-and-the-rise-of-no-vote-common-shares/ [https://perma.c
c/P6Q4-QKTJ] (“With NYSE-listed Snap’s arrival with ‘zero’ rights for public shareholders,
perhaps the bottom has been reached.”); Eric Jhonsa, Zillow Plans To Issue Non-Voting Class
C Shares, SEEKING ALPHA (July 21, 2015, 9:54 PM), https://seekingalpha.com/news/2643935
-zillow-plans-to-issue-non-voting-class-c-shares [https://perma.cc/W9E5-N82F] (reporting
that Zillow created “Class C shares that carry no voting rights”); Floyd Norris, The Many
Classes of Google Stock, N.Y. TIMES: ECONOMIX (Apr. 2, 2014, 6:03 PM), https://economix
.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/04/02/the-many-classes-of-google-stock/ [https://perma.cc/5PTXTEU6] (describing issuance of Class C shares in Google that have no voting rights).
25
See Michael A. Hiltzik, NYSE Decides to End Its One-Share, One-Vote Standard, L.A.
TIMES, July 4, 1986, at BUS1.
26
Although dual class can be used in private companies, venture capital (“VC”)-funded
issuers are more likely to use capital structures in which different classes of securities have
varying economic rights. It does appear, however, that some VC-funded companies are
adopting dual class structures prior to the IPO. See, e.g., Julia Boorstin, Facebook’s New Dual
Class Structure - Slow Steps to an IPO, CNBC (Mar. 18, 2010, 12:19 AM), https://www.cnbc.
com/id/34134917 [https://perma.cc/7H77-T53N] (citing Facebook and Google’s adoption of
dual class structures prior to their IPOs). In addition, some significant private companies have
eliminated dual class structures—Uber is the most notable example. See Mike Issac, Uber
Shareholders Including Kalanick Loosen Grip With Sales of Stock, N.Y. TIMES, Jan 15, 2018,
at B2 (explaining Uber’s plan to eliminate its “super voting shares”).
27
Winden, supra note 17, at 864-65.
28
Joel Seligman, Equal Protection in Shareholder Voting Rights: The One Common
Share, One Vote Controversy, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 687, 699 (1986) (reporting that NYSE
banned dual class stocks entirely in 1940); Winden, supra note 17, at 864 (noting that NYSE
generally prohibited dual class structures from mid-1920s until mid-1980s).
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terms designed to ameliorate the impact of the high vote stock.29 These terms
included a requirement that the low vote holders be permitted to elect 25% of
the company’s directors to the board.30 The Wang Laboratories IPO triggered a
spate of dual class listings at the IPO stage that continued until the 2000s.31
In 1986, in response to an effort by General Motors to retain a dual class
structure—a structure that was then-barred under the listing requirements of the
NYSE—in connection with its acquisitions of Electronic Data Systems and
Hughes Aircraft, the NYSE voted to eliminate a sixty-year old rule that imposed
a one-share/one-vote standard on all listed companies.32 The NYSE rule change
required SEC approval and, in 1988, rather than approving the proposed rule
change, the SEC adopted Rule 19c-4 which, for the most part, prohibited the
creation of dual class voting structures.33 The Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit struck down the rule as beyond the scope of the SEC’s rulemaking
authority.34
In the wake of the court’s decision, the stock exchanges adopted rules that
allowed dual class stock, but only if it was issued at the IPO stage.35 For a
number of years following these rule changes, use of dual class structures was
limited to “businesses, media companies seeking to ensure their publications
could maintain journalistic editorial independence, or other companies led by a
strong group of insiders.”36

29

Id. (explaining that these terms became known as “the Wang Formula”).
Id.
31
Id. at 865 (“At least twenty-two other companies followed the Wang formula with initial
public offerings on the AMEX and seven more recapitalized into dual-class structures
according to the Wang formula.”).
32
Hiltzik, supra note 25 (reporting that NYSE rule change was intended to allow NYSE
to compete with exchanges with more relaxed rules).
33
Voting Rights Listing Standards; Disenfranchisement Rule, 17 C.F.R. § 240.19c-4
(1990). The rule contained variations exemptions and did not apply to existing issues. See
Robert D. Hershey, Jr., U.S. Court Overturns S.E.C. Rule, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 1990, at D1
(describing SEC’s response to General Motors’s request).
34
Bus. Roundtable v. Sec. Exch. Comm’n, 905 F.2d 406, 409-16 (D.C. Cir. 1990). See
generally Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Short Life and Resurrection of SEC Rule 19C-4, 69
WASH. U. L. REV. 565 (1991); Jeffrey N. Gordon, Ties that Bond: Dual Class Common Stock
and the Problem of Shareholder Choice, 76 CAL. L. REV. 1, 69-75 (1988).
35
See Proposed Rule Changes by NYSE, AMEX and National Association of Security
Dealers, Inc., Relating to the Exchanges’ and Association’s Rules Regarding Shareholder
Voting Rights, 59 Fed. Reg. 42,614 (Aug. 11, 1994). Technically, the rule prohibits midstream issuances that have the effect of reducing the voting rights of existing shareholders.
36
David J. Berger & Laurie Simon Hodrick, Are Dual-Class Companies Harmful to
Stockholders? A Preliminary Review of the Evidence, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP.
GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Apr. 15, 2018), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/04/15/aredual-class-companies-harmful-to-stockholders-a-preliminary-review-of-the-evidence/
[https://perma.cc/R59V-8PLH].
30
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The recent boom in dual class stock began with the 2004 IPO of Google.
Google went public using a high vote (ten votes to one) common share option
designed to preserve control with the founders Sergey Brin and Larry Paige.37
The rationale provided at the time was spelled out in a letter to shareholders.
Brin and Paige wrote that:
In the transition to public ownership, we have set up a corporate structure
that will make it harder for outside parties to take over or influence Google.
This structure will also make it easier for our management team to follow
the long term, innovative approach . . . .
....
Google has prospered as a private company. We believe a dual class voting
structure will enable Google, as a public company, to retain many of the
positive aspects of being private.38
The Google founders specifically noted that dual class stock was rarely used
in technology companies at the time.39 But Google opened the floodgates, and
thereafter, dual class stock has become a norm for technology companies.40

37

Google Inc., Registration Statement (Amend. No. 9 to Form S-1), at 1 (Aug. 18, 2004).
Id. at 29-30.
39
See id. at 30.
40
See Berger & Hodrick, supra note 36 (“Since 2010, there have been an increasing
number of technology companies going public with dual-class (or multi-class) share
structures.”).
38
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Figure 1. Number of Dual Class Listings as a Percentage of U.S. IPOs (five year
moving average).41

Facebook, Linkedin, and Snap have all undertaken IPOs with dual class
listings.42 And, so far in early 2019, IPOs of technology companies Lyft,
Pinterest and Zoom have gone public with dual class stock.43 In all, about half
of dual class share listings since the Google IPO are of technology companies.44
Indeed, so common is dual class stock that when Twitter went public without it,
41

Figure 1 sets forth figures compiled by Professor Jay Ritter on the rise of dual class
stock in IPOs. Inv’r as Owner Subcomm., supra note 12, at 1 (citing Jay R. Ritter, IPOs from
1980 – 2016 with Multiple Share Classes Outstanding, WARRINGTON C. BUS., https://site.
warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/files/2017/01/IPOs-from-1980-2016-with-Multiple-Share-ClassesOutstanding.pdf [https://perma.cc/9QWB-Y2F9] (last visited Apr. 10, 2019)).
42
Benjamin Robertson & Andrea Tan, Dual Class Shares: Second-Class Investors?,
BLOOMBERG (Jan. 14, 2019, 9:25 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/quicktake/dual-classshares (noting that Facebook, LinkedIn, and Snap, among others, have all gone public with
dual class structures).
43
See Rani Molla, More Tech Companies Are Selling Stock That Keeps Their Founders in
Power, RECODE (Apr. 11, 2019, 10:14 AM), https://www.recode.net/2019/4/11/18302102/
ipo-voting-multi-dual-stock-lyft-pinterest.
44
Steven Davidoff Solomon, Shareholders Vote with Their Dollars to Have Less of a Say,
N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Nov. 4, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/05/business/
dealbook/shareholders-vote-with-their-dollars-to-have-less-of-a-say.html (“More than 13.5
percent of the 133 companies listing shares on United States exchanges in 2015 have set up a
dual-class structure . . . . About half the companies choosing the structure were in the
technology industry.”).
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a front page news article in the business section of the New York Times explicitly
highlighted it.45 More recently, CII reports that, in 2017, 19% of IPO companies
had dual class structures.46 Dual class structures are also common outside the
United States.47
The reasons postulated for the increasing use of dual class stock vary. They
include protection of the founder’s vision from divergent, less capable interests;
simple entrenchment;48 the need for technology companies to respond to greater
information asymmetries;49 and the desire to stem short-termist interests in the
capital markets.50 While the reasons vary, they are often summarized as the
Google founders did—as a tool to insulate the founder and the board from people
(i.e., investors) who will question, critique, or impede the founder’s vision.51
Dual class is most commonly defended as providing thick insulation of the
company from outside, perhaps value-destructive, interests.
Whatever the reason, today dual class structures are not just the purview of
technology companies. The media industry has long utilized a dual class
structure to protect themselves from investors who might limit their journalistic
integrity.52 And as dual class has become more common, it has been utilized by
clothing manufacturers, grocery stores, hamburger chains, and various other
45
Steven Davidoff Solomon, In Twitter’s I.P.O. Filing, Signs of a Start-Up That Has
Matured, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Oct. 8, 2013, 4:33 PM), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/
2013/10/08/in-twitters-i-p-o-filing-signs-of-a-start-up-that-has-matured/ (“Twitter surprised
many by electing to maintain a more traditional corporate governance structure, spurning the
dual-class shares that are in favor with technology companies because they give the founders
control of the company.”).
46
COUNCIL OF INSTITUTIONAL INV’RS, supra note 1, at 1.
47
See, e.g., Renée Adams & Daniel Ferreira, One Share-One Vote: The Empirical
Evidence, 12 REV. FIN. 51, 55 (2008) (“Multiple-voting shares are common in Sweden (59%),
France (58%) and the Netherlands (41%) . . . .”); Anita Anand, Governance Complexities in
Firms with Dual Class Shares, 3 ANNALS OF CORP. GOVERNANCE 184, 190 (2018) (“In
Canada, the list of DCS firms includes icons of the Canadian corporate establishment:
Bombardier, Power Corp., Rogers Communications, Onex and Canadian Tire.”).
48
See, e.g., Winden, supra note 17, at 903 (identifying potential of dual class structures to
“entrench the entrepreneur in control of the company”).
49
Id. at 890, 891 n.103 (observing that “entrepreneurs naturally have information about
their businesses that they are not able to make public for competitive reasons”).
50
Warren E. Buffett, Chairman’s Letter, BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC. (Feb. 28, 1997),
http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/letters/1996.html [https://perma.cc/VC9D-TTN2]
(explaining that creation of Class B stock was to prevent “a speculative bubble in [Berkshire
Hathaway] stock”).
51
See Larry Page & Sergey Brin, 2004 Founders’ IPO Letter, ALPHABET (2004),
https://abc.xyz/investor/founders-letters/2004/ipo-letter.html
[https://perma.cc/LK3WA8VN] (“We have implemented a corporate structure that is designed to protect Google’s
ability to innovate and retain its most distinctive characteristics.”).
52
See, e.g., Ava Seave, 45 Media Companies Where Investors Are Flying Second Class,
FORBES (Oct. 21, 2013, 5:02 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/avaseave/2013/10/21/45media-companies-where-investors-are-flying-second-class/ [https://perma.cc/6AQ9-3U6L].
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companies across industries.53 Figure 1 shows that from 2005 to 2015, the
number of IPOs employing dual class stock rose by 44%. Dual class has also
spread to other countries. A 2017 study found that 24% of companies in a sample
involving sixteen European countries had a dual class structure.54
C.

The Debate over Dual Class

The widespread use of dual class stock in a variety of different industries has
sparked a furious debate over its efficacy. This debate has been carried out both
in academia and public forums and has been shaped by a developing, yet to date
inconclusive, body of empirical evidence.55
1.

Empirical Evidence

As an initial matter, some academics have argued that the IPO market offers
a sufficient constraint on the inefficient use of the dual class structure. Under a
traditional law and economics analysis, rational investors will take into account
the potential costs and benefits of dual class at the time of the IPO.56 In this
scenario, investors will pay less for the stock at the time of the IPO if they deem
dual class harmful. Alternatively, if they view it as beneficial they will pay more.
In either case, because dual class stock is “priced,” policy prescriptions are
unneeded. And while companies may change situations over time, in a
diversified market some will do better than others, meaning shareholders will
earn a market return. Indeed, if market participants effectively price the potential
costs associated with dual class at the IPO stage, dual class stock should be
impervious to empirical analysis.
This argument assumes that markets are efficient at the IPO stage in pricing
dual class stock, an assumption that is controversial. An extensive literature
argues that the IPO market is not efficient in pricing governance terms.57
Moreover, this argument ignores any externalized effects of dual class stock. For
53
COUNCIL OF INSTITUTIONAL INV’RS, DUAL CLASS COMPANIES LIST (2018),
https://www.cii.org/files/Board%20Accountability/Dual%20Class%20Company%20List%2
02018.pdf [https://perma.cc/LGF4-5FKW].
54
SHEARMAN & STERLING LLP, INSTITUTIONAL S’HOLDER SERVS. & EUROPEAN CORP.
GOVERNANCE INST., REPORT ON THE PROPORTIONALITY PRINCIPLE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION
15, 26-27 (2007). See generally Morten Bennedsen & Kasper Meisner Nielsen, Incentive and
Entrenchment Effects in European Ownership, 34 J. BANKING & FIN. 2212 (2010).
55
See, e.g., Goshen & Hamdani, supra note 8 (discussing tradeoff between minority
protection and controller rights in adopting concentrated ownership structures).
56
See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW 17-19 (1991) (claiming that terms in corporate governance “are fully priced
in transactions among the interested parties”).
57
See, e.g., Robert Daines & Michael Klausner, Do IPO Charters Maximize Firm Value?
Antitakeover Protection in IPOs, 17 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 83, 86-113 (2001) (questioning
efficiency of IPO market in pricing governance terms); Fisch, Hamdani & Davidoff Solomon,
supra note 21, at 42-43 (identifying limitations of IPO market in pricing governance terms).
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example, the chaos at Viacom over control of the company harmed employees,
suppliers, and other non-shareholder constituents.58 Even if the IPO market were
efficient, this harm would go unpriced.
The uncertain theoretical basis for valuing dual class stock is matched by
unclear evidence on the effect of dual class on value.59 A number of studies of
dual class firms in the era prior to Google found that dual class stock was valuedecreasing.60 These studies relied on basic agency theory as articulated by
Professors Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means concerning the separation of
ownership and control61 and the theoretical motivation of a controller to take
advantage of its differential voting and economic position to extract private
benefits.62 Numerous studies outside the dual class context provide further
theoretical justification that firm value and stock market returns decrease as the
divergence between voting and cash flow rights increases.63 Notably, however,
these studies focused primarily on family-owned and media companies, which
are very different from the technology companies that have adopted dual class
structures more recently.64

58

See, e.g., Anthony Noto, Viacom Continues to Cut Costs, Lays Off Employees, N.Y.
BUS. J. (Feb. 6, 2018, 4:04 PM), https://www.bizjournals.com/newyork/news/2018/02/06/
viacom-continues-to-cut-costs-lays-off-employees.html (reporting that Viacom laid off 1% of
its total staff).
59
See generally Anand, supra note 47, at 203-07 (summarizing empirical literature on
effects of dual class structures).
60
See, e.g., Henry DeAngelo & Linda DeAngelo, Managerial Ownership of Voting
Rights: A Study of Public Corporations with Dual Classes of Common Stock, 14 J. FIN. ECON.
33 (1985); Ronald C. Lease, John J. McConnell & Wayne H. Mikkelson, The Market of
Control in Publicly-Traded Corporations, 11 J. FIN. ECON. 439 (1983); Tatiana Nenova, The
Value of Corporate Voting Rights and Control: A Cross-Country Analysis, 68 J. FIN. ECON.
325 (2003); Luigi Zingales, Insider Ownership and the Decision to Go Public, 62 REV. ECON.
STUD. 425 (1995).
61
See generally ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION
AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932).
62
See, e.g., Alexander Dyck & Luigi Zingales, Private Benefits of Control: An
International Comparison, 59 J. FIN. 537, 540 (2004) (“The use of a company’s money to pay
for perquisites is the most visible but not the most important way in which corporate resources
can be used to the sole (or main) advantage of the controlling party.”).
63
See, e.g., Gompers, Ishii & Metrick, supra note 6, at 1084 (finding that firm value is
“negatively associated with the wedge between [insiders’ cash-flow rights and voting
rights]”); Michael L. Lemmon & Karl V. Lins, Ownership Structure, Corporate Governance,
and Firm Value: Evidence from the East Asian Financial Crisis, 53 J. FIN. 1445, 1447 (2003)
(finding lower stock returns in firm in which managers have “separated their control and cash
flow ownership”); Karl V. Lins, Equity Ownership and Firm Value in Emerging Markets, 38
J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 159, 181 (2003) (finding lower firm values “[w]hen
managers have control rights that exceed their proportional ownership”).
64
Google Inc., supra note 37, at 30 (“[S]imilar [dual class] structures are common in the
media business and has had a profound importance there. The New York Times Company,
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Another conflicting strand of research has identified potential valueincreasing attributes to the dual class structure.65 This literature attributes value
to dual class in certain circumstances, including when there is information
asymmetry between shareholders66 or shareholders with a short term focus.67
Others have found that dual class allows firms to cement long term relationships
with other constituencies and to make long-term investments.68 David Berger, a
prominent litigator at the Silicon Valley law firm Wilson Sonsini Goodrich &
Rosati, defended the increasing use of dual class stock stating that “it really was
developed to respond to the changing nature of our corporate republic.”69 Other
academics have also supported dual class structures. Professor Dorothy Shapiro
Lund argues that no-vote shares can “lessen agency and transaction costs” by
reducing inefficiencies.70 Many shareholders do not exercise their voting rights,
so Lund argues that allowing “rationally apathetic investors” to sell their voting
rights would distribute voting rights more optimally.71 Professor Bernard
Sharfman also argues that dual class shares allow private ordering to increase
value through bargaining.72
Empirical research has documented that, at least in the early years following
an IPO, dual class firms may outperform firms with a single class of stock.
the Washington Post Company and Dow Jones, the publisher of The Wall Street Journal, all
have similar dual class ownership structures.”).
65
See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Why Firms Adopt Antitakeover Arrangements, 152 U. PA. L.
REV. 713, 714-17 (2003) (identifying theories as to how dual class structures may increase
firm value).
66
Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic
Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777, 783 (1972).
67
Jeremy C. Stein, Efficient Capital Markets, Inefficient Firms: A Model of Myopic
Corporate Behavior, 104 Q.J. ECON. 655, 661-65 (1989); Jeremy C. Stein, Takeover Threats
and Managerial Myopia, 96 J. POL. ECON. 61, 61-64 (1988).
68
DeAngelo & DeAngelo, supra note 60, at 35 (suggesting that reduced exposure to
competition may encourage investments in innovation); Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole,
Repeated Auctions of Incentive Contracts, Investment and Bidding Parity, with an Application
to Takeovers, 19 RAND J. ECON. 516, 530-31 (1988) (identifying potential efficiency
justifications for defensive tactics, including dual class structures); cf. Andrei Shleifer &
Lawrence H. Summers, Breach of Trust in Hostile Takeovers, in CORPORATE TAKEOVERS:
CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 33, 40-41 (Alan J. Auerbach ed., 1988) (noting that incumbent
managers are successful because they build relationships of trust with stakeholders).
69
David Berger, Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati, Why Dual-Class Stock: A Brief
Response to Commissioners Jackson and Stein, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE &
FIN. REG. (Feb. 22, 2018), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/02/22/why-dual-class-stocka-brief-response-to-commissioners-jackson-and-stein/#1 [https://perma.cc/ZKY5-43GU].
70
Dorothy Shapiro Lund, Nonvoting Shares and Efficient Corporate Governance, 71
STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 4) (emphasis omitted), https://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3028173 [https://perma.cc/8HMK-7LY8].
71
Id. (manuscript at 5-6).
72
Bernard S. Sharfman, A Private Ordering Defense of a Company’s Right to Use Dual
Class Share Structures in IPOs, 63 VILL. L. REV. 1, 7 (2018).

2019]

THE PROBLEM OF SUNSETS

1073

Professors Martijn Cremers, Beni Lauterbach, and Anete Pajuste, for example,
find that dual class firms outperform their single class counterparts for seven to
eight years after an IPO.73 Professors Lindsay Baran, Arno Forst, and Tony Via
find that insider control at multi-class firms has a positive effect on innovation,
at least in the early years following an IPO.74 Similarly, Professors Hyunseob
Kim and Roni Michaely find that firms with multi-class structures outperform
single class firms for eleven years following the IPO.75 Most recently, an MSCI
study found that issuers with unequal voting rights outperformed the market over
a ten year period.76
These studies are not only conflicting but in many cases suffer from
econometric limitations. The primary issue with finance studies of dual class
stock is selection effects—namely that the companies that select into dual class
structures differ in important ways from companies that adopt single class
structures.77 More specifically, companies with value decreasing corporate
governance or those otherwise prone to poor performance may select into dual
class structures in order to insulate the board and executives from their poor
performance. If this is the case, dual class stock is merely a symptom of poor
governance or performance and not itself value reducing. And companies are
able to implement these structures at the IPO stage due to inefficiencies in the
IPO process itself. Relatedly, companies with strong governance and value
creation mechanisms may prefer this structure in order to cement ties with other
constituencies and truly plan for the long term. In either case, no finance study
has to date adequately disentangled these effects and addressed this selection
issue.

73

Martijn Cremers, Beni Lauterbach & Anete Pajuste, The Life-Cycle of Dual Class Firms
1, 27 (European Corp. Governance Inst., Finance Working Paper No. 550, 2018), https://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3062895 [https://perma.cc/PMD9-ZHLL].
74
Lindsay Baran, Arno Forst & M. Tony Via, Dual Class Share Structure and Innovation
4 (Dec. 21, 2018) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=3183517 [https://perma.cc/A5Q4-ZQB7] (finding that “[d]ual class structures
enhance firms’ innovative outputs”).
75
Hyunseob Kim & Roni Michaely, Sticking Around Too Long? Dynamics of the Benefits
of Dual Class Structures 19 (European Corp. Governance Inst., Finance Working Paper No.
590, 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3145209 [https://perma.cc/
XHD4-4KBL].
76
Dimitris Melas, Putting the Spotlight on Spotify: Why Have Stocks with Unequal Voting
Rights Outperformed?, MSCI (Apr. 3, 2018), https://www.msci.com/www/blog-posts/put
ting-the-spotlight-on/0898078592 [https://perma.cc/WMF6-A2LQ] (reporting research
showing that “unequal voting stocks in aggregate outperformed the market over the period
from November 2007 to August 2017, and that excluding them from market indexes would
have reduced the indexes’ total returns by approximately 30 basis points per year over our
sample period”).
77
See, e.g., Cremers, Lauterbach & Pajuste, supra note 73, at 31-32 (discussing problem
of selection effects in study of dual class firms).
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A second issue is time. Companies with dual class stock may have life spans
as long as public firms. Dual class stock may create value in the early years when
the company is implementing its long-term agenda. However, dual class
companies may suffer in later years as the founders become distracted or future
generations take control of the company. A recent example is Viacom, where
the controller, Sumner Redstone, refused to give up control of the company
despite being incapacitated and unable to speak.78
In their paper, Cremers, Lauterbach, and Pajuste analyze this issue. The
authors find that in a sample of dual class firms matched with a single class
sample from 1980-2015, dual class firms on average have a higher valuation at
the IPO stage than single class firms, a premium which disappears over time.79
These findings generally align with another study of the matter by Professors
Kim and Michaely, who also find that, in the early years, dual class firms have
higher valuations but in later years are less agile and dynamic.80
These studies address the time issue, but they too suffer from econometric
issues. More specifically, in both studies the authors rely on matched pair
analysis to address selection effects. In a matched pair analysis, a dual class
company is matched with a similar non-dual class company to compare
performance.81 This yields a sample of comparable firms that can then be
compared on an average basis. This is an accepted technique in econometrics,82
however the quality and scope of the match always creates uncertainty. In the
case of the Cremers and Kim papers we simply do not know the quality and fit
of the match, particularly due to the selection issue. In addition, most studies of
time-based effects focus on firms prior to the Google IPO, out of necessity. The
Google IPO, however, changed the mix and character of dual class stock. PostGoogle, dual class became more wide-spread in growth companies in the
technology industry but also in other industries.83 Yet, most of the growth in
dual class companies has occurred in the last several years, making the long term
effect of these structures impossible to evaluate empirically.84 For example, the
78
Bebchuk & Kastiel, supra note 16, at 587-88 (discussing that ninety-three year old
Redstone refused to give up control despite “profound physical and mental illness”).
79
Cremers, Lauterbach & Pajuste, supra note 73, at 5.
80
Kim & Michaely, supra note 75, at 19. Both this study and that of Cremers, Lauterbach
and Pajuste use matched-pair analysis to attempt to address selection effects.
81
Cremers, Lauterbach & Pajuste, supra note 73, at 15-16 (describing matching of dual
class and single class firms based on IPO year and “several key characteristics”).
82
See generally Elizabeth A. Stuart, Matching Methods for Causal Inference: A Review
and a Look Forward, 25 STAT. SCI. 1 (2010) (providing overview of matching methodologies
in empirical research).
83
See supra notes 37-46 and accompanying text.
84
See, e.g., Rob Kalb & Rob Yates, Institutional S’holder Servs., Inc., Snap, Inc.
Reportedly to IPO with Unprecedented Non-Voting Shares for Public, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON
CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Feb. 7, 2017), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/
02/07/snap-inc-reportedly-to-ipo-with-unprecedented-non-voting-shares-for-public/
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Kim and Michaely study finds a turning point in the value of multi-class
structures eleven years after the IPO,85 but the vast majority of technology
companies with dual class structures went public less than eleven years ago.
Even if the econometric issues could be addressed, the use of dual class among
modern companies and its widespread growth have yet to be fully examined.
2. The Policy Debate
The uncertain empirical evidence has fueled an increasingly heated policy
debate over the use of dual class stock. As previously noted, Commissioner
Jackson called out dual class stock for perpetuating “corporate royalty.”86
Similarly, SEC Commissioner Kara Stein stated that these structures are
“inherently undemocratic, disconnecting the interests of a company’s
controlling shareholders from its other shareholders.”87
Commissioner Jackson’s arguments against dual class stock reflect a policy
debate within stock markets. Shareholder-rights advocates such as CII have led
the charge against dual class stock, asserting that stock with differential voting
should be barred and “every share of a public company’s common stock should
have equal voting rights.”88 The proxy advisory services, such as Institutional
Shareholder Services (“ISS”), have also denounced dual class stock.89 These
organizations have been joined by BlackRock, State Street Corporation, and T.
Rowe Price in calling for the elimination of stock with unequal voting rights.90

[https://perma.cc/464F-V8DV] (documenting fact that twenty Russell 3000 companies with
dual class structure held their first annual meeting in 2016, as opposed to only ten in 2015).
85
Kim & Michaely, supra note 75, at 18.
86
Jackson, Jr., supra note 7.
87
Kara M. Stein., Comm’r, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Remarks at Stanford University:
Mutualism: Reimagining the Role of Shareholders in Modern Corporate Governance (Feb.
13, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speech-stein-021318#_ednref45 [https://perma
.cc/E6Z6-LSNS].
88
Dual-Class Stock, supra note 4.
89
See INSTITUTIONAL S’HOLDER SERVS., U.S. PROXY VOTING GUIDELINES 32 (2018),
https://www.issgovernance.com/file/policy/latest/americas/US-Voting-Guidelines.pdf
[https://perma.cc/J2X4-R6X7] (reporting that ISS’s policy is generally to vote against
creation of dual class structures unless, inter alia, “[t]he company discloses a compelling
rationale for the dual-class capital structure”); Blair Nicholas & Brandon Marsh, Bernstein
Litowitz Berger & Grossmann LLP, Dual-Class: The Consequences of Depriving Institutions
of Corporate Voting Rights, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (May 17,
2017), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/05/17/dual-class-the-consequences-of-deprivin
g-institutional-investors-of-corporate-voting-rights/ [https://perma.cc/AA35-LSRA].
90
See Marriage, supra note 2 (stating that State Street “urged” SEC to block dual class
structures); Elzio Barreto & Sumeet Chatterjee, Blackrock Pitches for Shareholder
Protections as Asia Bourses Weigh Dual-Class Listings, REUTERS (Sept. 25, 2017, 2:19 AM),
https://uk.reuters.com/article/us-summit-regulation-blackrock/blackrock-pitches-forshareholder-protection-as-asia-bourses-weigh-dual-class-listings-idUKKCN1C10KD
[https://perma.cc/9BTF-FD7Y]; Nicholas & Marsh, supra note 89 (noting that BlackRock,
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In 2017, a new front opened in the war on dual class stock—several major
index providers decided to limit the inclusion of issuers with dual class voting
structures. The Financial Times Stock Exchange (“FTSE”) Russell decided to
exclude all firms in which the public shareholders hold less than 5% of the firm’s
voting power.91 S&P Dow Jones, which administers the S&P 500, among other
popular indexes, excluded all new dual class firms.92 MSCI decided to retain
dual class issuers in its major indexes but to create a series of new benchmarks
that contain voting rights in their eligibility criteria.93 The index providers made
this change at the behest of some index funds who did not feel that the dual class
governance structure was appropriate.94 At the time, in light of stock exchange
inaction, some commentators viewed the change as a back-door action.95
Notably, not all passive investors supported this decision. BlackRock, for
example, although publicly opposed to the dual class structure, expressed
concern that excluding dual class companies from the index would deprive its
index-based clients of “opportunities for returns.”96
The movement against dual class in the United States has been rejected by
international markets, which are seeing a trend towards allowing greater use of
dual class stock. In response to Alibaba’s decision to list in the United States in
State Street, and T. Rowe Price helped launch stewardship code that discourages dual class
shares).
91
FTSE RUSSELL, FTSE RUSSELL VOTING RIGHTS CONSULTATION – NEXT STEPS 2 (2017),
https://www.ftse.com/products/downloads/FTSE_Russell_Voting_Rights_Consultation_Ne
xt_Steps.pdf [https://perma.cc/5WGP-HFFZ].
92
Press Release, S&P Dow Jones Indices, S&P Dow Jones Indices Announces Decision
on Multi-Class Shares and Voting Rules (July 31, 2017), https://www.spiceindices.com/idpfiles/spice-assets/resources/public/documents/561162_spdjimulticlasssharesandvotingrulesannouncement7.31.17.pdf [https://perma.cc/3ATA-JJZF].
93
See Rachel Evans, MSCI Rejects Calls to Ban Dual-Class Stocks from Its Indexes,
BLOOMBERG (Oct. 30, 2018, 5:05 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-1030/msci-rejects-calls-to-ban-dual-class-stocks-from-its-indexes.
94
See Letter from Kenneth A. Bertsch, Exec. Dir., Council of Institutional Inv’rs, to
Members of the MSCI Equity Index Comm. (Aug. 3, 2017), https://www.cii.org/files/issues_
and_advocacy/correspondence/8-3-17%20CII%20response%20to%20MSCI%20Consutat
ion.pdf [https://perma.cc/YX2C-D3RT] (“CII’s membership includes strong supporters of
passive index strategies, and we believe that major index providers have a critical role to play
in preventing non-voting and multi-class equity structures from gaining unstoppable
momentum.”).
95
See Matt Levine, Listing Standards and Dividend Shares, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 13, 2017,
9:25 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2017-04-13/listing-standards-anddividend-shares (stating that actions of indexes put them in “weird role” and transgressed
“long tradition of corporate governance standards being imposed by stock exchanges as
‘listing standards’”).
96
Ning Chiu, BlackRock Wants Equal Voting Rights but Opposes Exclusion from Indexes,
DAVIS POLK BRIEFING: GOVERNANCE (Oct. 23, 2017), https://www.briefinggovernance.com/
2017/10/blackrock-wants-equal-voting-rights-but-opposes-exclusion-from-indexes/
[https://perma.cc/VK3S-W7HC].
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order to use a form of dual class stock, the Singapore and Hong Kong exchanges
amended their rules to eliminate their prohibitions on dual class stock.97 In
Europe there has been a strong move towards tenure voting, also known as
loyalty shares.98 Loyalty shares confer greater voting rights on shareholders who
hold their stock for a specified period of time and are frequently defended on the
basis that, by increasing the voting power of long-term shareholders, they
facilitate managing the corporation with a long-term perspective.99
Some commentators have argued that loyalty shares offer an intermediate
approach to the policy debate over dual class for two key reasons.100 First,
because loyalty shares confer higher voting rights on any shareholder who meets
the required holding period, they do not privilege the founder over public
shareholders.101 Second, the structure of loyalty shares makes founder control
increasingly contestable, as the founder’s economic stake decreases relative to
the holdings of outside investors.102 As a result, public shareholders are likely to
have greater power in situations in which the agency costs associated with
founder or managerial entrenchment are likely to be greatest.
Recent empirical work by Professors Paul Edelman, Wei Jiang, and Randall
Thomas supports this proposition.103 Edelman, Jiang, and Thomas model the
relative voting power of founders/managers and institutional investors under
various assumptions, and then, using these assumptions, run a series of
simulations seeking to evaluate the extent to which control is contestable.104

97

Hong Kong and Singapore Succumb to the Lure of Dual-Class Shares, ECONOMIST
(Mar. 1, 2018), https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2018/03/01/hong-kongand-singapore-succumb-to-the-lure-of-dual-class-shares.
98
France, which changed its law in 2014, and Belgium, which is currently considering a
draft law, provide double voting rights for shareholders who have held shares for at least two
years. Changes to French Takeover Rules, ALLEN & OVERY (Apr. 9, 2014), http://www.allen
overy.com/publications/en-gb/Pages/Changes-to-French-takeover-rules.aspx [https://perma.
cc/2FF8-DLRT]; Matthieu Duplat, Thomas Flament & Aurélie Cautaerts, Loyalty Shares for
Belgian Listed Companies: Fundamental Change on the Way, JONES DAY (June 2018),
https://www.jonesday.com/Loyalty-Shares-for-Belgian-Listed-Companies-FundamentalChange-on-the-Way-06-25-2018/.
99
See Paul Edelman, Wei Jiang & Randall S. Thomas, Will Tenure Voting Give Corporate
Managers Lifetime Tenure? 48-49 (European Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper No.
384, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3107225 [https://perma.cc/
R8MT-MT87] (describing and empirically analyzing effect of tenure voting on management’s
ability to retain control).
100
See, e.g., David J. Berger, Steven Davidoff Solomon & Aaron J. Benjamin, Tenure
Voting and the U.S. Public Company, 72 BUS. LAW. 295, 297 (2017) (describing tenure voting
as “an alternate capital structure that may curb perceived short-termism”).
101
See id. (“By design, tenure voting rewards all shareholders who hold their shares for an
extended period.”).
102
See id. at 310.
103
Edelman, Jiang & Thomas, supra note 99, at 2.
104
Id.
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They show that, although loyalty shares effectively preserve founder control
when the founder retains a 20-30% economic stake, when the founder’s
ownership declines to as little as 3%, outside investors obtain a meaningful
opportunity to challenge founder control.105
In sum, the shifting policy debate over dual class mimics the conflicting
empirical evidence: no definitive and known truth has yet emerged as to whether
and when dual class stock is desirable.106
II.

THE ROLE OF SUNSETS

Perhaps in response to the continuing debate over the efficacy of dual class
structures, critics have shifted to a more nuanced approach. Rather than
advocating an outright ban of dual class structures, these commentators
increasingly argue that if a company adopts a dual class structure, that structure
should be subject to a sunset provision. A sunset provision provides that, upon
some pre-specified date or event, the high vote stock converts to low vote stock,
effectively extinguishing the dual class structure.
Proponents of sunsets argue that they blunt the impact of the undemocratic
nature of dual class.107 Commissioner Jackson, for example, has focused his
opposition to dual class stock on the “perpetual dual-class” aspect.108 In a
landmark speech, he criticized perpetual dual class stock on the grounds that it
“raises the prospect that control over our public companies, and ultimately of
Main Street’s retirement savings, will be forever held by a small, elite group of
corporate insiders—who will pass that power down to their heirs.”109 He called
for exchanges to require, as a condition of listing, issuers with dual class to give
their shareholders the opportunity to eliminate the dual class structure at some
point in the future.110 Commissioner Jackson supported his position with
empirical evidence compiled by the SEC showing value-decreasing effects of
companies with perpetual dual class stock, as opposed to companies with dual
class that adopted sunset provisions.111 Commissioner Jackson also cited longheld American beliefs based on President Thomas Jefferson’s work against

105

Id. at 45-48.
See, e.g., Anand, supra note 47, at 205 (“[F]or virtually every study noting a problem
with DCS firms, there is a study either finding a benefit or a neutral effect of DCS on firm
value.”).
107
This Article questions the proposition that an inappropriate governance structure can
somehow be made acceptable if it is limited in duration, although it recognizes that this
principle has been accepted in other contexts. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306,
341-43 (2003) (observing that, although race-based admissions procedures may violate
Fourteenth Amendment, they may be permissible as long as they are limited in duration).
108
Jackson, Jr., supra note 7.
109
Id.
110
Id.
111
Id.
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“pseudo-aristocracy” and the idea that “[i]n America, we don’t inherit power,
and we don’t hold power forever.”112
Sunset provisions appear to be a middle ground argument designed to blunt
the impact of dual class stock. However, these arguments have focused on
sunsetting in general, and proponents of sunsets have focused primarily on timebased sunsets. We analyze both those positions in further detail.
A.

Time-Based Sunset Provisions

The type of sunset that has received the most widespread support is the timebased sunset.113 A time-based sunset requires that the dual class stock expire at
a pre-specified date, typically one that is established in the charter of the
company at the time of the IPO.114 The concept behind a time-based sunset is
that it provides a period of time for the founder to realize his idiosyncratic vision.
When the pre-set date arrives, share capital of the company converts to a single
class.115
1.

The Rationale for Time-Based Sunsets

Time-based sunsets are based on the proposition that, although a dual class
structure may initially enhance firm value, the utility of the structure declines
over time following the IPO. Several academic studies provide evidence of this
decline. For example, Professors Lucian Bebchuk and Kobi Kastiel show that
“as time passes, the potential costs of a dual-class structure tend to increase while
the potential benefits tend to erode.”116 Cremers, Lauterbach, and Pajuste find
similar trends, demonstrating that, although dual class firms are generally valued
more highly at the time of the IPO, that valuation premium is eroded in about
six to nine years post IPO.117 They further find that, over that time period, the
difference between voting power and equity stakes of the controlling
shareholders grows significantly.118 Kim and Michaely find that, as dual class
112

Id.
See, e.g., CFA INST., DUAL CLASS SHARES AND THE NEED FOR SAFEGUARDS 4 (2018),
https://www.cfainstitute.org/-/media/documents/survey/dual-class-shares-survey-report.ashx
[https://perma.cc/D27M-JXEF] (reporting that, in survey of CFA members in Asia Pacific,
ninety-four percent supported time-based sunset provisions as appropriate safeguard for
companies with dual class structures); Anand, supra note 47, at 234-37 (describing case for
fixed-time sunsets).
114
See, e.g., Press Release, Council for Institutional Inv’rs, Investors Petition NYSE,
Nasdaq to Curb Listings of IPO Dual-Class Share Companies (Oct. 24, 2018),
https://www.cii.org/files/issues_and_advocacy/correspondence/FINAL%20Dual%20Class%
20Petition%20Press%20Release%20Oct%2024,%202018.pdf [https://perma.cc/23QXGJ6H] (defining time-based sunsets).
115
Id.
116
Bebchuk & Kastiel, supra note 16, at 590.
117
Cremers, Lauterbach & Pajuste, supra note 73, at 5-6.
118
Id. at 10.
113

1080

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 99:1057

companies mature, their operating margins and labor productivity fall more and
the pace of innovation declines faster than single class companies.119
CII, which has long opposed dual class structures altogether, has taken the
position that, to the extent dual class structures are permitted, all dual class
companies should contain a mandatory time-based sunset provision. On October
24, 2018, CII submitted letters to NASDAQ and the NYSE asking them to
amend their listing standards to require newly listed companies with dual class
structures to include mandatory sunset provisions.120 According to CII, such a
provision should have the effect of converting the issuer’s high vote stock to
one-share, one-vote “no more than seven years after IPO date.”121 Similarly, the
Canadian Coalition for Good Governance (“CCGG”) has not advocated a
specific time limit but has stated that the dual class structure “should collapse at
an appropriate time . . . if practicable, as set out in the DCS company’s
articles.”122
Issuers have responded to the demand for time-based sunsetting. According
to a study by Andrew Winden, of a sample of 139 companies with dual class
stock, only two companies had time-based sunset provisions prior to 2010, but
currently 18% have time-based sunsets.123 For companies that went public in
2010 or after, 32% of dual class companies have a time-based sunset.124
2.

The Arbitrary Nature of Time-Based Sunsets

One challenge with sunsets is identifying the appropriate length of time before
the sunset is triggered. Among existing public companies with time-based
sunsets, the time period varies substantially from as short as three years, to as
long as twenty years in the case of the 2012 Workday IPO.125 Groupon has a five
year sunset, Yelp has a seven year sunset, and Fitbit has a twelve year sunset.126
EVO Payments filed to go public with a three year sunset.127 This issue persists
into 2019, with Zoom adopting a 15-year sunset and Pinterest adopting a sevenyear sunset that is triggered only when a holder’s ownership goes below 50% of
119

Kim & Michaely, supra note 75, at 2.
Letter from Ash Williams, supra note 20, at 1.
121
Id. The CII proposal would allow shareholders to vote to retain the dual class structure
at the end of the sunset period, a proposition that is explored further below.
122
CANADIAN COAL. FOR GOOD GOVERNANCE, DUAL CLASS SHARE POLICY 10 (2013),
https://admin.yourwebdepartment.com/site/ccgg/assets/pdf/Dual_Class_Share_Policy.pdf
[https://perma.cc/HW2F-82SF]. The CCGG principles authorize the holders of the low vote
shares to extend the dual class structure, but provide that any such extension “should remain
in effect for five years or such shorter period of time as is approved at the shareholder
meeting.” Id.
123
Winden, supra note 17, at 950-51.
124
Id.
125
Workday, Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1), at 31 (Aug. 30, 2012).
126
Winden, supra note 17, at 950-51.
127
EVO Payments, Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1), at 17 (Apr. 25, 2018).
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his IPO holdings.128 Lyft has no time-based sunset.129 According to Winden, the
most common period for a time-based sunset is seven or ten years.130 In CII’s
data of twenty-four companies that have gone public with time-based sunset
provisions, there is little consistency in the sunset period—10.5% of sunsets
were five years; 31.6% were seven years; 36.8% were ten years; and 21.1% were
longer than ten years.131
There is nothing inherently problematic about issuer-specific variation in the
sunset length. Theoretically, each firm should be picking the time period best
suited to its founder. But there is no evidence that this is the case. Rather, the
sunset lengths chosen by individual firms do not appear to be tied to
characteristics of the firms and their founders. For example, Workday went
public in 2012 with a twenty-year sunset provision.132 At the time of its IPO, its
founders were seventy-one and forty-six years old, meaning that they will be
ninety-one and sixty-six when the sunset is triggered.133
More problematic than the variation is the fact that the length of the sunset
period appears to be arbitrary and does not seem to correlate with any theory
about the length of time necessary for a founder to implement his or her vision.
If a founder’s strategic vision is flawed or the founder is otherwise inclined to
exploit private benefits, the insulation conferred by even a relatively short sunset
may be unwarranted. Commentators have noted, for example, that many dual
class issuers struggle financially even in the first few years after their IPO,
suggesting that, at least for these companies, a five or seven year sunset is much
too long.134 On the other hand, the benefits from the founder’s innovative vision
need not be limited to the initial years following the IPO. For example, the
founders of Facebook and Google are still at the helm of their companies and
appear to be creating value, despite being public for six and fourteen years
respectively.135
128
See Pinterest, Inc., Amended Registration Statement (Form S-1/A), at 182 (Apr. 8,
2019); Zoom Video Communications, Inc., Amended Registration Statement (Form S-1/A),
at 127 (Apr. 16, 2019).
129
See Lyft, Inc., Amended Registration Statement (Form S-1/A), at 204 (Mar. 27, 2019).
130
Winden, supra note 17, at 950-51.
131
COUNCIL OF INSTITUTIONAL INV’RS, supra note 1, at 1.
132
Workday, Inc., supra note 125, at 31.
133
Id.
134
See, e.g., Sam McBride, Snapchat Shows the Problems with “Visionary” Founders and
Dual Class Share Structures, NEW CONSTRUCTS (Sept. 13, 2018), https://www.new
constructs.com/snapchat-shows-the-problems-with-visionary-founders-and-dual-classshare-structures/ [https://perma.cc/8WLF-UF8M] (reporting on Snap’s poor financial
performance post-IPO and observing that Domo, Dropbox, and Green Sky have also
performed poorly).
135
Facebook, Inc., Prospectus, at 1 (May 17, 2012) (showing Facebook went public on
May 18, 2012); Google, Inc., Final Prospectus, at 1 (Aug. 18, 2004) (showing Google went
public on August 18, 2004).
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For similar reasons, a one-size-fits-all approach to sunsets—like those
proposed by CII or adopted by index providers—does not make sense. The
timeframe necessary for realizing a company’s goals is likely to vary depending
on the company, based on factors like the company’s maturity at the IPO stage,
the duration of its business model, and the time required to develop its products
or services and bring them to market.136
It is also uncertain whether any time-based sunset at the IPO stage can
successfully align founder vision with control. People change, as do firms. An
example of such a change is Sumner Redstone, who is ninety-five and in
declining health, but controls CBS through his ownership of National
Amusements.137 It may very well be that a founder’s vision is aligned with the
firm’s at the IPO level, but that, for a variety of reasons, including personal ones,
this diverges at some point. Predicting the point of this divergence purely by
passage of time is an impossible task.
Currently, the market has limited experience with the effect on an issuer when
a sunset provision is triggered. CII records only three companies in which the
dual class structure was terminated due to the effectiveness of a time-based
sunset provision: Groupon, MaxLinear, and Texas Roadhouse.138 All three
sunsets were triggered fairly recently.139 We therefore have little insight into
how these provisions will function in reality. Put differently, we lack sufficient
experience to determine whether the sunsets eliminate valuable protection for a
founder to implement his or her vision. Moreover, although some analysts have
observed that the elimination of the dual class structure may facilitate an issuer’s

136
See, e.g., Vinay Prasad & Sham Mailankody, Research and Development Spending to
Bring a Single Cancer Drug to Market and Revenues After Approval, 177 JAMA INTERNAL
MED. 1569, 1573 (2017) (finding that issuers in its study took average of six to fifteen years
to bring cancer drug to market).
137
Jessica Toonkel & Liana B. Baker, CBS Weighs Share Options for Post-Redstone Era,
REUTERS (Apr. 28, 2016, 5:58 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-cbs-votingsharesexclusive/exclusive-cbs-weighs-share-options-for-post-redstone-era-sourcesidUSKCN0XP31J [https://perma.cc/8CBY-8QZ8] (“CBS and Viacom both have dual-class
share structures with 80 percent of their voting shares owned by National Amusements . . . .”).
Because of these developments, National Amusements is effectively controlled by Sumner’s
daughter, Shari Redstone.
138
COUNCIL OF INSTITUTIONAL INV’RS, TIME-BASED SUNSET APPROACHES TO DUAL-CLASS
STOCK (2018), https://www.cii.org/files/Board%20Accountability/7-13-18%20Time-based%
20Sunsets.pdf [https://perma.cc/6CN5-UP4Y]. Yelp’s dual class structure also converted in
2016 due to a decline in the percentage of stock held by the founders. See Jason Aycock, Yelp
Caught in M&A Chatter, Up 2.6%; Ends Dual-Class Shares, SEEKING ALPHA (Sept. 23, 2016,
3:11 PM), https://seekingalpha.com/news/3210618-yelp-caught-m-chatter-2_6-percent-endsdual-class-shares [https://perma.cc/Y29R-8XQ7] (“The conversion was automatic as
outstanding class B stock represented [less] than 10% of outstanding shares.”).
139
See COUNCIL OF INSTITUTIONAL INV’RS, supra note 138 (stating that three sunsets were
converted between 2009 and 2018).
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acquisition, a result that could potentially increase firm value, buyouts of
companies in this limited sample have failed to materialize.140
3. The Moral Hazard Problem
Not only is it unclear that a time-based sunset can accurately predict what
duration of dual class is likely to maximize firm value, sunsets also create
problematic incentive structures. Time-based sunsets identify a specific date at
which a founder will lose control. This date, which Professor Jack Coffee
describes as a “sharp cliff,” increases the incentive for founders to use control,
while they have it, to maximize their personal economic position, even if their
actions sacrifice value for the minority shareholders.141 These incentives
increase as the expiration date for the dual class structure draws closer. For
example, the knowledge that the founder’s control is drawing to an end can cause
the founder to engage in short-termist behavior such as excessive risk-taking or
conservatism, self-dealing, or opportunistic behavior with other ventures.
Founders may seek to divert valuable opportunities to other firms, or to reduce
the degree to which they invest energy and innovative ideas in an issuer at which
they will soon lose control. A particular risk is that founders will enter into
transactions that enable them to sell their control block at a premium or that
provide them with other private benefits.142

140
See, e.g., Bryan Finnigan, End Of Yelp’s Dual-Class Share Structure Could Provide
Catalyst for Takeout, BENZINGA (Sept. 26, 2016, 11:14 AM), https://www.benzinga.com/
analyst-ratings/analyst-color/16/09/8495111/end-of-yelps-dual-class-share-structure-couldprovide-ca [https://perma.cc/74AZ-K6YB] (observing that Yelp’s elimination of dual class
makes it more attractive acquisition target); Will Healy, Yelp Inc Is a Buyout Target
Masquerading As a Growth Company, INVESTORPLACE (Feb. 8, 2018, 12:15 PM),
https://investorplace.com/2018/02/yelp-inc-yelp-stock-buyout-target-growth/
[https://perma.cc/S5PM-288E] (observing that buyout of Yelp “remains far from certain”).
141
Coffee, Jr., supra note 3.
142
Although corporate law allows a controlling stockholder to obtain a control premium
upon the sale of the control block, it is unclear what legal standard courts would apply in
evaluating such a transaction. One legal response is to require dual class issuers to provide
takeover protective provisons (“coatails”) that ensure that minority shareholders can
participate in a change of control transaction on the same terms as the holders of high vote
stock. See TORONTO STOCK EXCHANGE, TSX COMPANY MANUAL § 624(l), http://tmx.comp
linet.com/en/display/display_main.html?rbid=2072&element_id=299 [https://perma.cc/S49
X-TERX] (last visited Apr. 10, 2019) (describing coatails and requiring listed dual class
issuers to include coatails, terms of which are pre-approved by TSX). A controlling
stockholder may have other options such as entering into a position in which he or she has
other options including an acquisition in which the founder obtains a management position in
the acquiring company. For example, MuleSoft founder Greg Schott retained control of
MuleSoft, which was to be operated as a separate division upon MuleSoft’s acquisition by
Salesforce. See Phil Wainewright, How MuleSoft Will Change the Way Salesforce Connects
Its Clouds, DIGINOMICA (June 22, 2018), https://diginomica.com/2018/06/22/how-mulesoftwill-change-the-way-salesforce-connects-its-clouds/ [https://perma.cc/4MEK-T7B7]
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Conversely, the controller may attempt to prolong the time of the dual class
stock. Companies without sunset provisions have already engaged in similar
transactions. For example, Google and Zillow have issued Class C non-voting
shares that allow the controller to further dilute its interests without giving up
control.143 Facebook also attempted this maneuver but withdrew the proposal in
light of litigation.144
4.

Shareholder Retention Voting

Supporters of mandatory sunset provisions have attempted to respond to the
argument that the automatic trigger of a time-based sunset provision may not
align with the time period appropriate for the founder to engage in value-creating
behavior by coupling a time-based sunset with an optional shareholder retention
vote. Such a vote would enable existing shareholders, voting on a one-share/onevote basis, to retain or extend the dual class structure prior to its expiration.145
For example, the CII proposal would allow shareholders of dual class issuers to
vote on a one-share/one-vote basis to extend the dual class structure.146
Similarly, the dual class principles issued by the CCGG allow the minority
shareholders to vote to extend the dual class structure for a maximum of five
years beyond its termination date.147
The retention vote would have the effect of providing minority shareholders
with an option. If, in their view, the founder’s control is continuing to enhance
firm value, the minority shareholders can vote to retain it. If, however, the
insulation has outlived its usefulness or generates excessive agency costs, the
shareholders can vote against retention, at which point the shares will convert
automatically to a single class structure.
Commentators have devoted little attention to analyzing the operation of such
a shareholder vote, however. Any expectation that a vote of existing minority
shareholders will function efficiently to identify situations in which there is
value to retaining a dual class structure is highly problematic. First, existing
minority shareholders will invariably benefit from eliminating dual class, as the
effect of the sunset will be to transfer control from the founders to the public
(“MuleSoft will remain an independent business unit within Salesforce under the leadership
of its existing CEO Greg Schott . . . .”).
143
Jhonsa, supra note 24; Norris, supra note 24.
144
See Alex Heath, A Power Struggle Between Facebook and Investors Just Ended with
Facebook Dropping Plans to Issue Non-Voting Shares, BUS. INSIDER (Sept. 22, 2017, 2:37
PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/facebook-settled-lawsuit-non-voting-shareszuckerberg-testify-2017-9.
145
See Letter from Ash Williams, supra note 20, at 1 (calling for mandatory sunset
provisions “subject to extension by additional terms of no more than seven years each, by
vote of a majority of outstanding shares of each share class, voting separately, on a one-share,
one-vote basis”).
146
Dual-Class Stock, supra note 4.
147
CANADIAN COAL. FOR GOOD GOVERNANCE, supra note 122, at 10.
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shareholders. As the courts have recognized in other contexts, the value of this
control is substantial.148 Accordingly, public shareholders will be conflicted in
evaluating the voting decision as they will have to weigh the value of obtaining
control against the potential value of extending the dual class structure.
Second, the need of dual class is based on the proposition that market forces
are not sufficient to enable public shareholders to evaluate the founder’s vision
and the firm’s long-term business plan adequately and will, as a result,
imprudently sacrifice long-term firm value. Therefore, defenders of dual class
argue that it is necessary to insulate the founder from short-termist market
pressure.149 To the extent that market forces are not sufficient to enable public
shareholders to evaluate and price sunset provisions accurately at the IPO stage,
it is unclear why their ability to do so midstream will be superior. As a result,
the theory that public shareholders can properly evaluate whether to retain dual
class at the time of the retention vote seems inconsistent with the basic premise
of the dual class structure.
One possible response is that, at the time of the retention vote, shareholders
have better information with which to evaluate the value of dual class. When
voting on whether to retain the dual class structure, public shareholders have the
benefit of knowing how the firm has performed subsequent to the IPO, and they
have the enhanced transparency of that performance afforded by the public
reporting process. Although this observation is fair, it does not meaningfully
distinguish the retention vote from the IPO stage or the role of market discipline
during the initial pre-sunset period. The rationale for dual class in either case is
that shareholders are limited in their ability to evaluate and appreciate the
founder’s long-term vision going forward and that, on net, insulation from
market discipline will promote innovation and increase firm value. Many recent
dual class IPOs involved issuers of substantial size that relied on the private
capital markets to operate for a number of years. If dual class structures are
appropriate, it is because investors cannot reliably evaluate and protect the future
innovative behavior of those issuers. Similar information asymmetries are likely
to limit public shareholders’ ability to evaluate an issuer’s potential for further
innovation in the context of a sunset retention vote.
Similarly, although the shareholder retention vote can also be understood as
providing a form of insurance against a founder implementing the dual class
stock in a value destructive manner, this Article rejects that justification as a
basis for requiring a time-based sunset. The insurance argument highlights the
substantial potential costs in terms of a misapplication of the sunset period and
148

See, e.g., Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 47 (Del. 1994)
(“The existence of a control block of stock in the hands of a single shareholder or a group
with loyalty to each other does have real consequences to the financial value of ‘minority’
stock.” (quoting Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. Time Inc., No. 10,866, 1989 WL 79880, at *23
(Del. Ch. July 14, 1989))); In re Books-A-Million, Inc. S’holders Litig., No. 11343, 2016 WL
5874974, at *13 (Del. Ch. Oct. 10, 2016) (“Financial markets in widely traded corporate stock
accord a premium to a block of stock that can assure corporate control.”).
149
See, e.g., Goshen & Hamdani, supra note 8, at 580-81.
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the potential for founder misconduct prior thereto. While quantifying these costs
is impossible, they could easily outweigh the benefits of this insurance. In short,
the insurance claim proves too much—if insurance is truly warranted, it is
because of the potential costs of the dual class structure.
B.

Alternative Sunset Provisions

As explained in the preceding Section, the mere passage of time is a poor
proxy for evaluating whether the utility of a dual class structure has evaporated.
To the extent that sunsets are an appropriate response to a decline in the value
of dual class structures, they should focus more precisely on objective events
that are more likely to result in the founder losing track of his or her mission or
being overly incentivized to favor his or her own interests. This Article terms
such provisions “event-based sunsets.”
This Section identifies several events in this category such as dilution of the
founder’s interest, the founder’s death or departure from the issuer, and the
transfer of voting rights to third parties such as heirs. Issuers have adopted eventbased sunsets in varying degrees,150 but they have received far less investor
attention than time-based sunsets. This Article concludes that, although the
market has not focused carefully on structuring event-based sunsets
appropriately, they offer a more promising approach. As of yet, however, the
costs and benefits of event-based sunsets are untested, and it is equally unclear
whether they can be designed in a way to overcome the limitations of time-based
sunsets discussed above. As a result, while this Article does not advocate the
imposition of mandatory event-based sunsets, it encourages investors and
commentators to develop event-based sunset provisions through private
ordering.
1.

Dilution of the Founder’s Interest

Bebchuk and Kastiel argued that part of the problem with dual class is an
increasing gap between the founder’s voting power and his or her economic
interest—they term this gap the “wedge.”151 They find that an increase in the
size of the wedge is correlated with a decrease in firm value, and they reason
that as the economic stake of the founder is reduced while voting control remains
the same, the founder is incentivized to reap private benefits from the firm.152
This incentive problem can manifest through wealth transfers from the firm to
the individual or favored interests, or through the founder’s decision to push the
firm in directions that satisfy his or her non-economic idiosyncratic visions. An
increased wedge can also reduce the founder’s engagement in operations.

150

See Winden, supra note 17, at 950-51 (presenting data on issuer use of various forms
of event-based sunsets).
151
Bebchuk & Kastiel, supra note 16, at 603.
152
Id.
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These and other incentive problems theoretically justify sunsets keyed to
dilution, and such sunsets are relatively common. According to Winden there
are forty-eight companies in his sample with dilution-based sunsets.153 The level
of dilution required to trigger the sunset ranges from 5% to 25% with 54% of
companies having a 10% dilution trigger.154 Again, this threshold seems
arbitrary, and there is evidence of issuers gravitating to a one-size-fits-all
approach. In contrast to time-based sunsets, however, the rationale of the
dilution sunset is to ensure that the founder retains a meaningful economic
interest in the issuer, and there is a plausible argument that once the founder’s
interest drops below 10%, his or her economic interest is no longer sufficiently
aligned with the interests of the issuer. Moreover, to the extent that the founder
wants to avoid triggering the sunset, the solution is to retain a sufficient stake in
the firm which will benefit all shareholders by reducing the size of the wedge
and maintaining the alignment of interest between the founder and the firm.
As of the time this Article was written, the dual class structure of at least one
issuer, Yelp, has been terminated due to the triggering of a dilution-based
sunset.155 Yelp went public in 2012 with a dual class structure containing a
provision that it would be automatically converted into a single share structure
once the founders’ economic stake dropped below 10%.156 This occurred on
September 23, 2016 and in the wake of this declassification, Yelp stock rose
2.6%.157 The conversion would have occurred much later if Yelp had adopted a
standard time-based sunset.
This Article does not claim that dilution-based sunsets address all the
limitations of time-based sunsets, and further refinement of their operation is
likely necessary to make them sufficiently responsive to the concern described
above. In particular, because of the founder’s higher voting rights, the threshold
for triggering the sunset under dilution-based sunsets as currently structured may
be too low. At the time of its IPO, Zynga’s dual class stock, for example, gave
its founder, Mark Pincus, seventy votes per share, meaning that Pincus could
retain control with an economic interest of less than 3% of the company.158
Universal Health Services’ Class C common stock gives founder Alan Miller
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Winden, supra note 17, at 872.
Id. at 872-73. The dilution may also be based upon a sale of a specific percentage of
the founders’ stock, but the same principles apply.
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Aycock, supra note 138.
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Id.
157
Id. On that day the S&P 500 fell by 12 points. Harvey S. Katz, William G. Ferguson &
Adam Rosner, Stock Market Today: September 23, 2016, VALUE LINE (Sept. 23, 2016),
http://www.valueline.com/Markets/Daily_Updates/Stock_Market_Today__September_23,_
2016.aspx#.XEYzefx7lmA [https://perma.cc/J22L-CGJD].
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See Austen Hufford, Zynga Moves to Single-Class Share Structure, WALL STREET J.
(May 2, 2018, 4:39 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/zynga-moves-to-single-class-sharestructure-1525293576.
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one hundred votes per share.159 Concededly, it is likely impossible to measure
the right level of dilution or the effect of this divergence of interest in dual class
stocks.160
Theoretically, however, dilution-based sunsets offer a response better tailored
to the concern that, as the founder’s economic interest is reduced, his or her
incentives become misaligned sufficiently to create a risk of rent-seeking or
other value-destroying actions. Further, dilution-based sunsets do not create the
same perverse incentives as time-based sunsets because the founder can avoid
the trigger by retaining a sufficiently large economic stake.
2.

Transfer of the Founder’s Interest

Dual class stock sometimes allows the holders of high vote shares to transfer
the higher voting rights together with a transfer of the shares by sale, gift, or
inheritance. The most infamous example is Facebook which permits Mark
Zuckerberg to transfer his high vote stock to his heirs.161 Snap also allows for
transfers to heirs.162 Provisions that permit founders to transfer high vote stock
to their heirs would appear to conflict directly with the justification for dual class
of protecting the founder’s ability to achieve his or her idiosyncratic vision.
Although an argument could be made that the founder’s successors will continue
to pursue the founder’s vision, there is little reason to expect that the founder’s
heirs have any advantage in doing so. Indeed, asset destruction through
intergenerational transfer is well-documented.163 Allowing a founder to retain
high voting rights, even upon the transfer of the stock, instead enables the
founder’s heirs to convert a control right that is designed to maximize firm value
into a private benefit.
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Universal Health Servs., Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 23-24 (Feb. 28, 2017).
Pinterest, at the time of its IPO, had three founders with high vote (20-1) stock. Its
sunset provision is triggered if, after a seven-year period from the IPO, a founder sells more
than 50% of his interest. We question the logic of combining a dilution sunset with a timebased sunset. Moreover, Bebchuk and Kastiel calculate that two of the founders would still
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outstanding equity capital.” Lucian Bebchuk & Kobi Kastiel, The Perils of Pinterest’s DualClass Structure, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Apr. 10, 2019),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/04/10/the-perils-of-pinterests-dual-class-structure/
[https://perma.cc/GQ69-MWK3].
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56 (June 2, 2016).
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Snap Inc., Bylaws of Snap Inc., at 22 (amended June 30, 2013).
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See, e.g., George Stalk & Henry Foley, Avoid the Traps That Can Destroy Family
Businesses, HARV. BUS. REV., Jan.-Feb. 2012, at 25, 25 (describing “the propensity of familyowned enterprises to fail by the time the founder’s grandchildren have taken charge”).
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As a result, sunset provisions that convert high vote stock to one-share/onevote when the founder bequeaths or gifts that stock appear to be common sense.
The observation that the founder may transfer high vote stock to third parties
who do not warrant the insulation of the dual class structure is not limited to
situations such as inheritance, however. Investors might have similar concerns
when the holder of high vote stock sells in a market transaction. Notably, dual
class stock differs from tenure voting in that many dual class structures do not
automatically convert the high vote stock when it is sold or transferred, even
though the transfer presumably removes control from the founder whose vision
the structure was designed to protect and vests that power in someone else.
Transfers of high vote stock have broader potential to erode value from the
firm and the public shareholders. For example, as noted above, Delaware law
currently allows controlling shareholders to sell their interest for a premium.164
The ability of a controlling shareholder to do so could, in the case of dual class,
lead to a wealth transfer from the public shareholders to the controller. Such a
wealth-transfer is particularly problematic in situations in which the sale is
designed to avoid the effects of a mandatory conversion. A number of dual class
issuers have responded to this problem by including equal treatment provisions
in their charters.165 These provisions prevent high vote shareholders from selling
their stock at a premium over the price that is available to low vote
shareholders.166 In In re Delphi Financial Group Shareholder Litigation,167
Delphi had a charter providing that both its high and low voting stock would
receive the same consideration in any merger, and founder Robert Rosenkranz
attempted to use his high vote shares to amend the charter and remove that
provision. The court concluded that Rosenkrantz’s effort to do so was
coercive.168
3.

Death, Incapacitation, or Departure of the Founder

The death, incapacitation, or departure of the founder raises similar issues to
those posed by transfers. The effect may be compounded however by the fact
that when a founder dies or is incapacitated but retains voting control, the
company can be left without leadership or direction.
As previously mentioned, a paradigmatic example is Sumner Redstone and
the two companies he controls: CBS and Viacom. Redstone is now ninety-five

164
See Abraham v. Emerson Radio Corp., 901 A.2d 751, 753 (Del. Ch. 2006) (“Under
Delaware law, a controller remains free to sell its stock for a premium not shared with the
other stockholders except in very narrow circumstances.”).
165
See Kirby Smith, The Agency Costs of Equal Treatment Clauses, 127 YALE L.J. FORUM
543, 561 (2017).
166
Even without such a charter provision, a controller’s premium can be reviewed and
benchmarked against the market of similar sales. Id. at 562.
167
No. 7144-VCG, 2012 WL 729232 (Del. Ch. Mar. 6, 2012).
168
Id. at *17.
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and reportedly is unable to speak coherently or move about.169 His incapacitation
has led to litigious corporate governance battles at both Viacom and CBS
between Mr. Redstone’s daughter, Shari Redstone, and the boards of each
company.170 In each case, the companies attempted to defy Mrs. Redstone’s
attempts to assert her father’s voting power. This resulted in costly battles that
ended in the departure of both firms’ CEOs and a restructuring of each
company’s board.171
Sunsets to prevent this situation can take several forms. A sunset can be
triggered by the founder’s death or incapacitation.172 For example, a sunset that
converts high vote shares to single vote shares can be triggered when the founder
is no longer chief executive officer of the company or no longer involved in the
day-to-day operations. Again, if dual class is designed to insulate the founder’s
idiosyncratic vision, that insulation is no longer warranted when the founder is
not making operational decisions.
Of course, issuers can voluntarily eliminate their dual class structure upon the
occurrence of this type of event. For example, Zynga, which was heavily
criticized for its seventy-to-one dual class structure, converted to a single class
structure after founder Mark Pincus left as CEO and it was announced he was
transitioning from chairman of the board to non-executive chairman.173 Zynga’s
shares rose 1.4% in trading upon this announcement.174 Pincus’s conversion
decision was voluntary, however. A departure-based sunset would provide
predictability. In addition, a departure-based sunset is particularly useful if the
founder’s departure is due to medical reasons or an intra-corporate dispute.
One might expect sunsets of this type to be commonplace given the
foreseeable nature of these events, but they are not. Winden documents that only
forty-eight dual class companies have this type of provision, while ninety-one
do not.175 It is unclear why these provisions are not more common, but it may
be a function of the inefficiencies of the IPO market. Given the relatively recent
growth in the number of issuers that go public with dual class structures, the
169
Bebchuk & Kastiel, supra note 16, at 587-88 (citing Emily Steel, Viacom Chiefs Take
Trust Battle to Court, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 2016, at B1).
170
Id. at 588.
171
See, e.g., James B. Stewart, How Dauman Lost the Battle for Viacom, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
25, 2016, at B1 (describing changes at Viacom); Cynthia Littleton, CBS at Crossroads: Board
Considers Options That Will Influence Decision on Next CEO, VARIETY (Nov. 6, 2018, 4:06
PM), https://variety.com/2018/tv/news/cbs-board-redstone-moonves-viacom-1203021104/
[https://perma.cc/U48H-XBEH] (noting departures of CBS CEO Leslie Moonves and other
senior executives and challenges facing new board).
172
Andrew Winden takes the reasonable position that “[d]eath and incapacity sunsets
should be included in all dual-class charters.” Winden, supra note 17, at 924.
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death or incapacitation of a founder may have limited salience to investors. More
specifically, the inclusion of these provisions may depend upon the law firm
utilized at the IPO stage as well as the idiosyncrasies of the founder.
Moreover, in the case of incapacity, the sunset is often based on the total
disability of the holder. Lyft for example defines “disability” as:
the permanent and total disability of such Founder such that such Founder
is unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any
medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be
expected to result in death within 12 months or which has lasted or can be
expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months as
determined by a licensed medical practitioner . . . .176
This broad definition preserves the founders’ ability to retain their shares even
if they are no longer engaged (or able to be engaged) in the operation of the
company.
4.

Other Sunsets

The foregoing discussion identifies several types of event-based sunset
provisions that are more closely tied to developments that undercut the original
justification for a dual class structure than time-based sunsets. The list offered is
illustrative, not exhaustive; other situations may raise similar concerns and
warrant treatment through a sunset provision. For example, one could imagine
creating a dual class structure with a sunset that is triggered by a founder’s
misconduct, such as a breach of fiduciary duty, although the authors are not
aware of any issuers that have adopted such a provision.177
III. MOVING FORWARD
This analysis of sunsets and dual class stock has a number of implications.
First, and perhaps most important, the debate over sunsets should be separated
from the debate over the efficacy and desirability of dual class voting structures.
Commentators appear to be supporting sunsets as a compromise on the merits
of dual class, but the value of dual class stock should be debated on its own
merits. The inclusion or omission of a sunset provision does not resolve the
question of whether dual class structures are problematic. Instead, policy
responses to dual class stock should focus on the economic value and social
welfare effects of dual class.
In the short term, empirical studies are unlikely to resolve the debate over dual
class definitively. That feature does not distinguish dual class from many other
176

Lyft, Inc., Amendment No. 2 to Form S-1 Registration Statement, Exhibit 3.2 Restated
Certificate of Incorporation of Lyft, Inc. at 2 (Mar. 27, 2019).
177
Winden reports that, in his sample, no issuers have a sunset for breach of fiduciary
duties. Id. at 852 n.150.
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corporate governance provisions, such as staggered boards and poison pills.178
It may be the case that the value of governance provisions is firm-specific and
that a particular provision is value-enhancing for some firms and valuedecreasing for others.179 Alternatively, further experience with dual class
structures may clarify the extent to which they add value by solidifying control
with a visionary and value-creating entrepreneur,180 or whether they
counterproductively entrench that control in circumstances in which the vision
of the entrepreneur declines or is lost.181
In this scenario, sunsets should not be understood as a regulatorily imposed
fix to minimize the duration of a problematic governance structure, but as a
feature that offers the potential to align the use of dual class stock with value
creation. In this regard, there should be more thorough and rigorous thinking,
both about the use of sunsets and about the form that such sunsets should take.
In particular, this Article argues that the growing effort to force dual class
issuers to adopt time-based sunsets is inappropriate. Time-based sunsets should
not be a necessary precondition for the use of dual class stock, and calls for the
imposition of such a requirement through regulation, exchange listing
requirements, or restrictions on index inclusion are misguided. Although timebased sunsets appear to reflect a compromise position, as this Article
demonstrates they are poorly tailored to addressing the potential limitations of
the dual class structure. At the same time, time-based sunsets may lead to
complacency about dual class structures and encourage investors and the
markets to accept dual class where its potential value is questionable.
To date, however, this Article’s analysis suggests that investors and the
market do not know enough about either dual class or sunsets to use regulation,
index requirements, or stock exchange rules to force companies into time-based
sunsets. Instead, we should allow private ordering, but encourage greater
attention to the specific developments that are likely to erode the potential value
of dual class, such as dilution, transfer, disability, and departure. There is
particular value to market participants working to develop norms and standards
around the types of sunsets that the market should demand of dual class issuers.
This Article calls for lawyers to be more capacious in drafting sunset provisions
and for institutional investors to pay greater attention to the specific features of
sunset provisions as well as the manner in which they operate in the context of
a specific firm. Finally, to the extent that issuers adopt retention votes as a
178

See, e.g., Lucian Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, The Costs of Entrenched Boards, 78 J. FIN.
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component of their dual class structures, proxy advisory firms, such as
Institutional Shareholder Services, need to develop principles by which to
evaluate whether retention or termination of a dual class structure is warranted.
Finally, to an extent, the debate over dual class and sunsets has a tendency to
overlook broader questions about the role and purpose of voting rights in
publicly traded companies. By increasing the relative voting power of the
founder, dual class structures operate to limit the voting power of public
shareholders. As such, they raise questions about the importance of voting rights,
the issues on which shareholders can and should exercise voting authority, and
the viability of alternatives to voting—such as exit, litigation, and engagement—
for limiting the power of controlling shareholders.182
Examination of these issues is critical as the composition of the investor base
continues to evolve. Large institutional investors, many of which rely primarily
on index-based investment strategies, own an increasing percentage of publicly
traded securities.183 Commentators debate the incentives of these investors,184
the extent to which they engage in informed voting decisions,185 and the degree
to which their investment objectives are subject to short-termism.186 The policies
and procedures by which these investors exercise their voting power may vary
depending on the subject matter of the vote.
In a stylized world, the effect of dual class on issuer control can be modeled
in terms of voting outcomes.187 In the real world, the impact of dual class is less
clear. By way of example, after a series of scandals involving Uber,
commentators warned that shareholders lacked the power to restrain or remove
then-CEO Travis Kalanick because of the voting power he held by virtue of
Uber’s dual class structure.188 Nonetheless, in the face of pressure from Uber’s
major investors, Kalanick resigned, and Uber’s board subsequently removed the
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See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch & Simone M. Sepe, Shareholder Collaboration, 98 TEX L. REV.
(forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 54-55), http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=3227113 [https://per
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183
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dual class structure.189 Uber’s dual class structure did not, in the end, prevent the
company from responding to a founder who was limiting corporate value.190
CONCLUSION
The increasing adoption of dual class structures has generated concern. In
response, some commentators have called for the adoption of sunset provisions
to limit the duration of the dual class structure. This Article argues that
compulsory sunsets, and time-based sunsets in particular, are an inappropriate
response to the potential problems of dual class stock. Although sunsets tied to
particular events that are likely to reduce the value of dual class—such as
dilution, transfer, or departure of the founder—may prove valuable, experience
with such sunsets is limited to date. Consequently, although this Article
encourages issuers and investors to experiment with the development and use of
event-based sunsets, it suggests, at present, that experimentation take place
through private ordering.
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